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In this article, Dr Blanca Mamutse, an insolvency specialist at the University of Surrey,
examines the recent Court of Appeal’s judgment in two important cases on the scope of the
anti-deprivation rule in modern day insolvency litigation.
Years from now, when we pause to reflect on the case law generated by the
financial crisis,the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the appeals of Perpetual Trustee
Company Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and Butters v BBC Worldwide Ltd
[1] will doubtless feature prominently among the decisions pertaining to the
validity of certain contractual provisions in the event of a party’s insolvency.The
court considered the scope of the anti-deprivation rule,which has a long history
in insolvency law.
The rule essentially provides that a contract whereby a person’s property is
transferred to a third party on his bankruptcy is void at common law.The facts
giving rise to the Perpetual and Butters appeals demonstrate two different ways in
which it may be called into application.
Facts of the Perpetual appeal
a) The claimants represented noteholders in respect of Notes issued by companies
established as special purpose vehicles (SPVs) by Lehman Brothers Group.
b) Using the proceeds of the Note subscriptions, the SPVs acquired government
bonds and other secure investments (‘the collateral’).
c) The collateral was vested in a trust corporation,BNY Corporate Trustee Services
Ltd (‘the Trustee’).
d) The Notes issued by the SPVs were governed by trust deeds.In addition to these,
a swap agreement was entered into between the SPVs and Lehman Brothers Spe-
cial Financing Inc (‘LBSF’).Under this agreement,LBSF paid the SPVs the amount
due by them to the Noteholders,in exchange for an amount equal to the yield on
the collateral. Insofar as the sum payable by LBSF under the swap agreement
exceeded the yield on the collateral, the Noteholders received a premium for the
credit insurance which they effectively provided to the Lehman Brothers Group.It
was expressly provided that these transactions were governed by English law.
e) A charge over the collateral secured the SPVs’ obligations to LBSF and the
Noteholders. Under the terms of the trust deeds:
i)  this security would become enforceable if any amount due in respect of the
Notes was not paid, or the swap agreement terminated with sums due to
LBSF as swap counterparty; and
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realisation of the security were to be paid according to
a specified order of priority. LBSF as swap counter-
party would enjoy priority over the Noteholders
unless an event of default occurred,and LBSF was the
defaulting party. This would result in the priorities
being reversed,so that the Noteholders would be paid
before LBSF.
f) On 15 September 2008 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc
(‘LBHI’) applied to the United States (‘US’) Bankruptcy
Court for protection under Chapter 11 of the US Bank-
ruptcy Code. LBSF followed suit in October 2008. Both
filings constituted an event of default for the purposes of
the swap agreement,and activated the Noteholder priority.
g) After 15 September 2008 the periodic payments due by
the SPVs to the Noteholders and by LBSF to the SPVs
were not made.
h) The Noteholders sought to compel the trustee to enforce
its security and apply the proceeds towards payment of
their claims, in priority to LBSF.
Facts of the Butters appeal
This matter arose from the insolvency of the Woolworths
group of companies.
a) A company referred to as ‘Media’ was a subsidiary of
Woolworths Entertainment Group Ltd, which was in
turn a subsidiary of the holding company Woolworths
Group plc (‘Group’).
b) Media had a 40% shareholding in 2 Entertain Ltd (‘2e’).
The remaining 60% of shares were owned by BBC
Worldwide Ltd (‘BBCW’).Among 2e’s subsidiaries was a
company called BBC Video Ltd (‘Video’).
c) A Joint Venture Agreement (‘JVA’) entered into between
BBCW,Group,Media and 2e set out the terms on which
BBCW and Media held shares in 2e.The JVA contained
provisions which enabled BBCW to purchase Media’s
shares in 2e on an insolvency event.
d) Completion of the JVA was conditional on BBCW
granting Video a licence to exploit BBCW’s video and
DVD catalogue, and other rights in respect of the BBC’s
future television programmes. This was done in accor-
dance with a Master Licence Agreement (‘MLA’)
between Video and BBCW.A key provision of the MLA
entitled BBCW to terminate the MLA on the happen-
ing of an insolvency event.
e) Group went into administration in January 2009. This
was followed by Media’s entry into the procedure in
February 2009. Both of these occurrences constituted
insolvency events under the JVA and MLA, prima facie
empowering BBCW to purchase Media’s shares in 2e
and terminate the MLA.
f) When steps were taken to value the shares in 2e, Media
raised the objection that the relevant clauses of the JVA
and MLA were void.
The Court of Appeal’s decision: 
general observations on the ambit 
of the anti-deprivation rule
Lord Neuberger MR began by acknowledging the
uncertainty surrounding the application of the rule:
It is not entirely easy to identify the rule’s precise
limits, or even its precise nature…as the reasoning
in the various judgments in which the rule has
been considered is often a little opaque, and some
of the judgments are a little hard to reconcile.
In determining the ambit of the anti-deprivation rule,
certain principles had to be borne in mind.The first is that
British Eagle v Compagnie Nationale Air France [2] is high
authority for the proposition that the rule is founded on
public policy to the extent that one cannot contract out of
the insolvency legislation.
Second, echoing International Air Transport Association v
Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd [3], in cases where the rule was
invoked it was vital to proceed from the elementary premise
that ‘insolvency law is statutory and primacy must be given
to the relevant statutory text’.
Third, in considering whether the rule applied to a
particular contractual provision, in principle there was no
difference between cases where the provision was expressed
to apply on insolvency or liquidation,and those where it was
not so expressed.
Fourth, the courts should not extend the rule beyond its
present limits, except to satisfy the needs of practicality and
logic. Considering the basis of the rule, that one cannot
contract out of the provisions of the insolvency legislation,it
was hard to justify going beyond the established limits of the
rule save to the extent required by legislation. The
Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’) has more detailed and
wide-ranging provisions with regard to the effect of
transactions entered into before winding-up, than the
legislation which was in force when many of the English
cases applying the rule were decided.
Fifth,it is important to ensure that judicial decisions in the
field of insolvency remain clear and consistent.The need for
consistency and clarity has become more pronounced due to
the growing complexity of the nature and content of
commercial contracts,as evidenced by the contracts in these
appeals.Where possible, it is desirable that the courts give
effect to the contractual terms agreed by the parties:
… there is a particularly strong case for party
autonomy in cases of complex financial instru-
ments … and in arrangements involving large
corporate groups … in such cases, the parties are
likely to have been commercially sophisticated
and expertly advised.
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To this, Patten LJ added the observation that before a
commercial contract can be struck down on the ground of
public policy there must be certainty not only regarding the
exact nature of the policy rule sought to be enforced;but also
whether the unenforceability of the contract is necessary to
give effect to the policy objective enshrined in the rule. His
Lordship expanded on the notion of IA 1986 as a code,
holding that where Parliament had expressly considered the
kind of transactions which fall within the Act’s anti-avoidance
provisions, it was not appropriate for the court to seek to
widen the scope of those provisions by extending a common
law rule.The Insolvency Act 1986,in contradistinction to the
common law in the 19th century,contains a detailed code for
determining and regulating the property of an insolvent
company for the benefit of its general creditors. The anti-
deprivation rule could accordingly have no wider scope than
the statutory provisions it was designed to enforce.
Validity of the provisions under
consideration: Perpetual appeal 
Validity on the basis of the true origin of 
the assets
In determining whether the ‘flip’ from swap counterparty
priority to Noteholder priority brought about any
deprivation which breached the anti-deprivation rule, the
question was whether the ‘flips’ had the consequence of
reducing the assets which would otherwise be available for
distribution to the creditors. The essence of the
arrangements embodied in the extensive documentation did
not support this view:
• The collateral over which the rights were created was
acquired mainly with money derived from the Notehold-
ers through their subscription monies.
• LBSF provided little by way of subscription monies;it merely
agreed to pay the interest and capital due to the Noteholders
through the SPVs in exchange for the collateral.
• The scheme was sold on the basis that if LBSF or LBHI
defaulted so that the interest and capital on the notes was
not paid, then it would be the Noteholders who would
have priority in relation to repayment.
• Effecting the ‘flips’ would not entitle the Noteholders to
more than they had subscribed, and in the absence of a
shortfall would not have left LBSF out of pocket.
The ‘flip’ provisions therefore did not operate to divest LBSF
of money, property or debts vested in it and re-vest them in
the Noteholders, or to divest LBSF of the benefit of the
security rights granted to it.They simply changed the order of
priorities in which rights over the proceeds of the collateral
were to be exercised in the event of a default.The security
right granted to LBSF was a security right over assets
purchased with Noteholders’ money, and the priority and
extent of benefits LBSF enjoyed in respect of the security were
contingent upon there being no event of default.Following the
event of default, LBSF did not lose a right which it had been
granted over the proceeds of sale of the collateral; rather, it
retained its right but ranked behind the Noteholders in
accordance with an agreed feature of that right.
Three principles extracted from decided cases on the anti-
deprivation rule have a bearing on this situation.While the
rule had been held to apply to assets which were vested in the
person on whose bankruptcy the deprivation was to occur,in
this case all that changed were the priorities relating to the
right, pursuant to a provision in the very document creating
the right.There is authority for the notion that the rule would
not apply where the person in whose favour the ‘deprivation’
operated could show that the asset (or interest therein) was
acquired with his money – a requisite satisfied in this case
where the collateral was effectively purchased exclusively with
the Noteholders’ money [4]. Finally, the rule could not apply
to invalidate a provision which enabled a person to determine
a limited interest such as a lease or licence which he had
granted over his own property, in the event of the lessee or
licensee’s bankruptcy.A charge, or provision for priorities for
repayment, had similar features to a lease or licence, and
differed from ownership.Applied to the facts of this case,these
principles supported the conclusion that the anti-deprivation
rule did not apply to the operation of the ‘flips’in the relevant
contractual provisions. The proper analysis of the
documentation was that the Noteholders had granted rights
to LBSF over assets derived from their monies, which rights
were liable to be modified on the happening of an event of
default.This was a valid agreement, enforceable on or after
LBSF’s Chapter 11 filing.
Lord Neuberger MR accordingly rested his conclusion on
the ground that the assets over which the charge existed
were acquired with money provided by the chargee in
whose favour the ‘flip’ operated, and the ‘flip’ was included
merely to ensure that the chargee was repaid out of those
assets all that he provided (together with interest) before the
company received any money from those assets pursuant to
the charge. His Lordship emphasised the importance of
scrutinising the transaction, as it could be argued that in the
absence of these additional facts,the arrangement in this case
would have fallen foul of the analysis in Ex parte Mackay [5].
Validity on the basis of a conditional interest 
in the security
Patten LJ reached the same conclusion as Lord Neuberger
MR regarding the validity of the clauses,but focused on the
relationship created by the collateral. His Lordship stressed
that LBSF and its creditors had not been deprived of anyFINANCE & CREDIT LAW  . May 2010  . Drawing the limits of the anti-deprivation rule in insolvency law
4
property or asset to which they would have been entitled but
for its bankruptcy.The only interest or property which the
company had enjoyed was a charge granted by the SPVs,and
this security interest remained part of the property of LBSF,
unchanged by the event of its bankruptcy.
The reversal of the priority sequence was always a facet of
the security, designed to regulate the competing interests of
LBSF and the Noteholders over the collateral. To treat its
operation in the event of LBSF’s bankruptcy as constituting
the removal of an asset from the insolvent estate was to
confuse the security itself with the operation of its terms in
the manner prescribed by the charge. LBSF retained the
same amount as it had before its bankruptcy and likewise the
Noteholders did not obtain any security over the collateral
which they did not have before.
Enforceability of the contract, based on the
timing of the deprivation
Even if the ‘flips’ had constituted a deprivation within the
prohibition, the anti-deprivation rule would not have been
engaged in the present case, since the triggering event was
LBHI filing for Chapter 11. This occurred some 18 days
before LBSF filed for bankruptcy protection. It being
common ground that filing for Chapter 11 was for the
purposes of the rule equivalent to the making of a winding-
up order, the deprivation occurred before liquidation or its
equivalent.As a general rule, a deprivation that takes effect
before a winding-up order [6] is not caught by the rule,
unless it is effected pursuant to a sham transaction.There is
nothing inconsistent with the provisions of IA 1986 about a
contractual agreement which effects a deprivation of an asset
before a company goes into liquidation [7]. This was
supported by the decision in British Eagle that any
deprivations which occurred prior to the winding-up of
British Eagle were not caught by the rule, even though it
seemed likely that British Eagle had been insolvent some
time before it was wound up.
Moreover,in the interests of certainty it was necessary to
maintain the simple proposition that if deprivation
occurred before winding-up it did not fall within the scope
of the rule whereas if it occurred after winding-up it risked
doing so.This was because a party with the right to effect
deprivation could not always know whether the company
subject to the right was insolvent at a particular point prior
to liquidation. By comparison, no difficulty arose in
determining when a company went into liquidation.
Furthermore, it was hard to see why the right to deprive
for breach of contract or by means of notice should be
defeated on the basis of a company’s insolvency, even
though it had not entered into any formal proceedings
under IA 1986.
An additional element in the Perpetual case was that the
‘flips’were brought about by the liquidation of a party other
than the company which would suffer the deprivation.The
rule could not be engaged by the insolvency of a party other
than the company which would suffer the deprivation, and
extending it to cover this would lead to confusion when it
came to predicting its limits.
Validity of the provisions under
consideration: Butters appeal 
Similarly to Perpetual the two main issues were whether the
relevant contractual clauses in any way gave rise to an
infringement of the anti-deprivation rule;and if so,whether
the fact that they were operated before Media went into
administration meant that the rule did not apply. It was
found that there was nothing in the JVA and MLA
provisions, read separately or together, which could engage
the anti-deprivation rule.
Termination of a limited interest
As regards the MLA,in the absence of special circumstances,
a licence can be granted on any terms as to its termination
which the licensor wishes to agree with the licensee. A
provision for the termination of a licence in the event of
bankruptcy is common in relation to intellectual property
licences.The power to terminate a licence does not infringe
the anti-deprivation rule because it does not remove from
the estate property in which the insolvent company ever had
an unfettered interest.The liquidator is bound to take the
licence on the terms on which it was granted, the position
being a fortiori if the event of insolvency which triggered
the exercise of the right to terminate is that of a parent or
group company rather than the licensee.
In this particular case, the termination clause did not
infringe the rule because its invocation did not involve the
property of the insolvent party becoming vested in a third
party. It merely involved a limited interest being brought to
an end in accordance with its terms, by the third party who
had granted it to the now-insolvent party.
Acquisition for fair value
By contrast, the JVA clause under appeal involved property
which had been owned by a now-insolvent party, namely
Media’s shares in 2e, becoming vested in a third party –
BBCW. This clause, operating on the administration of
Media,would have breached the anti-deprivation rule if the
price payable for the shares was below market value. If the
licence termination provision of the MLA and right of pre-
emption under the JVA were each unexceptionable when
read individually, it was difficult to see how their joint
existence could render them objectionable.Now view this issue online at www.i-financial.com 
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Enforceability of the transaction, based on
timing of ‘deprivation’
Even if it were to be accepted that the JVA and MLA clauses
infringed the anti-deprivation rule, as a matter of timing it
would not have been engaged in this case.The insolvency
event which triggered the service of the notice related
purely to Group, and the notice enforcing the termination
clause and purchase of shares was served on Media before the
making of the administration order against Media.The point
made in regard to Perpetual was reiterated, namely that both
principle and practicality supported the view that the anti-
deprivation rule had no application where the deprivation
had been effected by the time a winding-up or
administration order is made against the company ‘deprived’
of its property.
It was conceded that this conclusion meant that it would
be reasonably easy in many cases to devise schemes to avoid
the rule. However, the Master of the Rolls opined that the
ultimate responsibility for guarding against anti-avoidance
devices in the insolvency field lay with Parliament, as
evidenced by ss238-239 IA 1986:
Especially in an area where Parliament has inter-
vened so substantially and so significantly, it can
only be very rarely … that it would be right for
the court to invent its own anti-avoidance policies
and frustrate the terms of commercial contracts
freely entered into by sophisticated parties.
Conclusion
Lord Neuberger MR carefully concluded his lead judgment
with the observation that there had been no departure from
the authority of British Eagle. Indeed, His Lordship
considered that he had 
… tried to adhere to the logic of that reasoning,
while also bearing in mind the need for clarity
and consistency in this area of the law,the unde-
sirability of interfering with party autonomy in
business transactions,the inappropriateness of the
courts extending the law in areas where Parlia-
ment has enacted an extensive code, and the
assistance which can be gleaned from a significant
body of jurisprudence.
These factors may nonetheless be seen as signifying a
modern approach to decisions regarding the influence of
British Eagle, and to this extent the court has rejuvenated
the anti-deprivation rule. It has positioned the Insolvency
Act 1986 as a boundary between these appeals and the 19th
and early 20th century precedent on the rule.Furthermore,
it has allowed the ‘good business reasons’ which could not
prevail in British Eagle [8] to inform its analysis of the
contractual documentation involved; and shown that the
timing of the deprivation,and the role of related companies
in triggering events may contribute to the validity of
transactions.
This development is accompanied by a recognition that
‘the multifarious, sophisticated and increasingly complex
arrangements contained in modern financial instruments’are
such that it remains difficult to precisely define the type of
deprivation provisions caught by the rule.For this reason,the
court indicated a preference for developing the law in this
area ‘on a relatively cautious,case-by-case basis.’An appeal to
the Supreme Court is pending.
Endnotes
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The facts 
T sold to A a Bombardier executive aircraft for a price of
US$31m.A paid a deposit of US$3m.T tendered delivery
but A refused to take delivery. In the event,T had to sell
the aircraft to another buyer for a sum of US$24m thereby
incurring a substantial loss.They sought to claim the loss
from A;A on the other hand sought to recover the deposit
money.
A’s case was that the contract was discharged as a result
of force majeure and that the deposit was in fact a penalty
and as such could be recovered.
The force majeure clause provided that:
‘Force Majeure. Neither party shall be liable to
the other as a result of any failure of, or delay in
the performance of, its obligations hereunder, for
the period that such failure or delay is due to:Acts
of God or the public enemy; war, insurrection or
riots; fires; governmental actions; strikes or labor
disputes; inability to obtain aircraft materials,
accessories, equipment or parts from vendors; or
any other cause beyond Seller’s reasonable con-
trol. Upon the occurrence of any such event, the
time required for performance by such party of its
obligations arising under this Agreement,shall be
extended by a period equal to the duration of
such event.’
In reliance on the clause,A asserted that the ‘unanticipated,
unforeseeable and cataclysmic downward spiral of the
world’s financial markets’ had made it impossible for them
to take delivery of the aircraft.The force majeure clause was
thus triggered allowing A to postpone the time to complete
the purchase. It would also affect the price at which A
should be entitled to purchase the aircraft.
There was also an allegation that it was inequitable to
seek specific relief against a foreign defendant.
The decision
The court rejected the argument that it had no jurisdiction
to make an order for specific performance of a contract as
regards the foreign defendant.
As to the argument of force majeure, Hamblen J held that
it was settled law that economic or financial hardship or
change in market conditions could not be an excuse for
non-performance.There was no case law authority for any
contrary proposition.The force majeure, properly construed,
did not assist the defendant.The clause did not expressly
refer to a change in economic circumstances. Without
specific terms to the effect the court would not,as a matter
of general principle, extend the force majeure clause beyond
what are the traditional boundaries of the doctrine of
frustration.
As for the argument that the deposit was a sum in
terrorem, the court held that the sum was not a penalty
because at merely 9.5% of the purchase price, it was by no
means unreasonable.Indeed,it would fall short of the actual
damage suffered by the claimant. It was therefore to be
treated as liquidated damages or a genuine attempt at
making a pre-estimate of potential loss.
Comment
The decision, while not breaking new ground in terms of
general principle,is important because it makes it plain that
extraordinary economic or financial difficulties could not
constitute a frustrating event.A force majeure clause must be
so explicitly drawn up if it is to be extended to discharge
the parties from contractual liability in such an event.
General words will not be extended to cover situations not
covered by the doctrine of frustration, as a matter of
principle.
On the issue of penalties, it is interesting academically to
see Hamblen J use a somewhat technical approach. The
judge considered the issue methodically by asking a series
of discrete questions:
• first, whether such deposit clauses are commonplace in
aircraft sale contracts;
• whether the amount was unusual;
• was it a genuine or reasonable pre-estimate of loss; and
• was it a true bargain between the parties.
Recent decisions have demonstrated a less methodical or
step-by-step approach to the issue;the preference being for
a more holistic and freedom of contract principle led
approach.The starting point in recent cases seems to that in
commercial contracts, such a payment clause would be
treated as liquidated damages unless it is exorbitant and
unconscionable.That said, the difference in approaches is
largely an academic question for our purposes in the
present context.
Briefings
Financial crisis is not force majeure
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The facts
Gladman demised the property by an underlease to Chiron for
10 years. Centaur acted as Chiron’s guarantor and was also
made a party to the underlease.Gladman Chiron and Centaur
then signed an ‘authorised guarantee agreement’. Under the
guarantee agreement,Gladman gave Chiron a licence to assign
the underlease to Total Home, which Chiron did. The
guarantee agreement also stated that Chiron and Centaur each
covenanted with Gladman that Total Home would pay rent
and perform the lessess covenants ‘until the next lawful
assignment of the Underlease’.
A few months later,Gold Harvest took over the headlease
and thus became Total Home’s direct landlord.Total Home
fell into arrears and Gold Harvest demanded that Centaur,as
guarantors, should pay. Centaur argued that s25 of Landlord
and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (‘the Covenants Act’)
nullifies the guarantee agreement to the extent that it
imposes liability on Centaur. The issue was therefore
whether that section precludes a person who has guaranteed
a tenant’s obligation under a lease from being required to
give a further guarantee in respect of an assignee of the lease.
Gold Harvest, on the other hand, contended that the
guarantee did not exclude,modify or frustrate the operation
of the Act and was therefore not avoided by the Act.They
argued that if it was Parliament’s intention to interfere with
the guarantor’s ability to give guarantees for assignees, it
could have made such a prohibition clear. Parliament’s
omission must therefore mean that it did not consider
guarantors to need protection in this respect. Additionally,
there was no good reason to bar guarantors from giving
guarantees for assignees.Where a tenant gives a guarantee for
an assignee, it is open to the original guarantor to provide a
sub-guarantee of the tenant’s obligations as guarantor; it
would be anomalous if the guarantor could not enter into a
direct guarantee for the assignee.
The decision
The High Court ruled that the guarantee was unenforceable.
It held that it was unlawful for a landlord to require an
assignee’s obligations to be guaranteed not only by the
outgoing tenant under a guarantee agreement but also by the
outgoing tenant’s guarantor.
Comment
Readers will appreciate that the Covenants Act has abolished
the old rule that a tenant remained liable to pay the rent and
perform the tenancy’s obligations throughout the whole term
of the lease,even after the lease has been assigned away.The Act
provides that for leases granted after 1995 the tenant will
automatically be released from those obligations as soon as the
lease has been assigned.The law also renders that any guarantee
of the tenant’s obligations will lapse when the lease is assigned.
However,an authorised guarantee agreement (‘AGA’) (s16,
Covenants Act 1995) may be permissible.The AGA imposes a
liability on the outgoing tenant to guarantee the liability of the
assignee.Such an agreement therefore does not guarantee the
tenant’s obligations but those of the tenant’s assignee. By and
large there are two ways of achieving this. One is where the
guarantor directly guarantees the obligations of the assignee.
Another is where the guarantor does not guarantee the
assignee’s obligations but the assignor’s obligations under the
authorised guarantee agreement – namely, there exists not a
direct guarantee but a sub-guarantee (because under the
authorised guarantee agreement,the assignor is presumptively
guaranteeing the assignee’s obligations).
The present case concerned the first type of guarantee. Mr
Justice Newey decided that if a guarantor is allowed directly to
guarantee the assignee’s obligations that would frustrate the
Act’s requirement that a guarantor’s obligations must
terminate following an assignment (s24,Covenants Act 1995).
As for sub-guarantees Newey J said:‘I do not think it is by any
means clear that the Covenants Act permits a guarantor to
sub-guarantee a tenant’s obligations under an AGA.’If Newey
J is right about sub-guarantees, then the consequence is that
guarantors of either the assignee or the assignor could not be
touched. Pending an appeal being allowed, this decision will
have important bearings on the law on landlord and tenancy.
At one level, landlords will be seriously affected because
while they can enforce an AGA against the outgoing tenant,
they will not be able to enforce a direct guarantee against a
guarantor and they may not be able to enforce a sub-
guarantee.An appeal clarifying the position would be useful.
If Newey J’s decision is confirmed,landlords must therefore
take other forms of security if they consider an AGA which
binds only the outgoing tenant not to be sufficient.
Lease guarantors as the assignee’s surety
and the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants)
Act 1995
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The European Parliament’s ECON Committee has recently
published report instigating a motion for the Parliament to
take regarding action to formulate policy on remuneration
policies for directors of listed companies and employees in the
financial services sector.At one level,it is immediately a matter
of some query and controversy that the two distinct areas
should be lumped together for policy making.That said, the
explanatory statement in the report states that excessive risk
taking was prevalent in the financial services sector which led
in turn to the ‘aggregate build up of systemic risk’ and that
such risk taking should therefore be properly controlled and
managed.In the report little distinction is made between firms
in the financial sector and listed companies. The general
assumption seems to be that listed companies raise finance in
the financial markets and as such, should be treated as part of
the build up of systemic risk.
What the report advocates
The report finds that while there are national initiatives having
been taken to moderate some remuneration policies and bonus
excesses by tax measures,salary caps and corporate governance
rules, the matter should be addressed by coordinated action at
EU level. It supports in general the several recommendations
taken by various committees and arms of the EU. It calls for
the adoption of binding principles on remuneration policies –
there is perhaps a contradiction in terms here. Can principles
be binding without their being conferred legislative status? On
the specifics, the report emphasises that every financial
institution and listed company should have a remuneration
committee. That committee should be independent of the
directors and should be accountable to shareholders and
regulators and supervisors. Non executive board members’
remuneration should comprise only fixed pay.There should be
no performance or share-based remuneration.
As to the composition of remuneration, the report stresses
that an appropriate balance between fixed and variable
remuneration must be maintained (probably by rules). In
particular,an individual’s bonus must not be in excess of  50%
of his or her total annual remuneration.
The monitoring of pay policy is entrusted to remuneration
committees.The report considers that a stronger role must be
given to the committee; the scope of the committee’s powers
should be a matter for discussion between risk managers,
shareholders and the supervisors.
An external measure also suggested by the report to ensure
that remuneration policies are properly controlled is the
imposition of higher taxes on financial institutions whose
directors are paid a compensation package above a prescribed
level.The Commission is also invited to consider a proposal to
impose on financial institutions a fee to be used to fund an
insurance scheme to prevent financial crises. Another
somewhat radical measure being proposed is the naming and
shaming of listed companies which do not adhere to the
principles on remuneration policies.
These are some of main recommendations of the report.It is
clear that the report is replete with implicit condemnations for
fat cat bankers and directors. It is wondered if that is the right
spirit to take on the subject of managing financial risk.There is
also a distinct lack of objective clarity as who causes what in
the financial crisis – as alluded to above,there is no distinction
made between financial institutions and listed companies
where remuneration policy is concerned.
EU legal developments
Directors’ remuneration policies 
in financial services